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Abstract 
Privatization, a method of reallocating assets and functions from the public sector to the private sector, appears to 
be a factor that could play a serious role in the quest for growth. In recent history, privatization has been adopted 
by many different political systems and has spread to every region of the world. The process of privatization can 
be an effective way to bring about fundamental structural change by formalizing and establishing property rights, 
which directly create strong individual incentives. Privatization, defined as the transfer of state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) to the private owners, has become a common economic policy tool all over the world. The trend toward 
privatization, however, has not been without debate. Indeed, the debate between the superiority of the private and 
public sectors has been going on for the past four to five decades. Privatization, a method of reallocating assets 
and functions from the public sector to the private sector, appears to be a factor that could play a serious role in 
the quest for growth. In recent history, privatization has been adopted by many different political systems and has 
spread to every region of the world. The process of privatization can be an effective way to bring about fundamental 
structural change by formalizing and establishing property rights, which directly create strong individual incentives. 
A free market economy largely depends on well-defined property rights in which people make individual decisions 
in their own interests. This paper is motivated by the ongoing debate among economists and policy makers about 
the efficiency and distributional effects of different methods and sequencing of privatizations around the world. 
Keywords: privatization, economic, ownership, firm performance, growth  
 
1. Introduction 
Privatisation accelerated in the 1990s. In Europe this was sparked by the liberalisation of markets at the European 
Union level and budgetary constraints faced by government (Parker,1999). Privatisation  particularly gained 
momentum in the late 1980s and spread to a wide range of developing economies. Over the last decade a significant 
proportion of privatization transactions have been in developing economies and have entailed sales of public 
utilities. Privatisation transactions for the utilities sector have accounted for over a third of all transactions in 
developing economies since 1988. Between 1988-93 the value of sales for infrastructure industries amounted to 
US $30 billion, compared to US $78 billion for all privatisation transactions in developing economies (World 
Bank, 1995(a), Kikeri, 1998). Unlike most other developing countries and until recently also China, the transition 
economies for instance did not merely privatize a number of key state-owned firms or strive to improve the 
functioning of their legal and institutional framework. they carried out a major transformation that made the share 
of private sector in GDP increase from extremely low levels (see e.g., Estrin, 1994) to between 60% and 90% (see 
EBRD, 2006) and they instituted from scratch a market-oriented legal and institutional system (see e.g., Svejnar, 
1991). The transition economies also differ from most other developing countries because of their relatively high 
level of human capital, initial lack of wealth in private domestic hands, and the heritage of anti-entrepreneurialism 
(see Estrin, Meyer, Bytchkova, 2006). However, they share with many other developing countries numerous 
characteristics associated with “weak” institutions, such as poorly conceived and/or ineffectively enforced 
property rights and insufficiently developed capital markets (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) for a 
discussion of the role of institutions in economic development). One can hence obtain valuable insights about the 
impact of privatization by focusing on the large literature dealing with the transition economies, while bringing in 
for comparison key findings obtained with respect to developing countries. It is appropriate to undertake a study 
of this type now because it has been fifteen years or more since the start of transition and one may hence draw 
relatively robust empirical conclusions and address more rigorously than hitherto the issues of causality. 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) made a major attempt to survey this literature, applying a meta-analysis to 
the findings from a large number of diverse early studies, combining various indicators of performance 
(restructuring) into one composite measure. They found that privatization to outside owners resulted in 50 percent 
more restructuring than privatization to insiders (current managers or workers). Privatization to workers had no 
effect in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and a negative effect in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) that replaced most of the former Soviet Union. Investment funds, foreigners and other block-holders were 
found to produce more than ten times as much restructuring as diffuse individual ownership. Hardening of budgets 
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constraints (i.e. curtailing firms’ access to formal or informal state subsidies) was also found to have a positive 
effect on restructuring. Among other factors, import competition had a positive effect on performance in CEE, but 
a negative effect in CIS. Overall, the authors noted that the impact of privatization on company performance was 
typically positive and statistically significant in CEE, but statistically insignificant in CIS. They explained this by 
the more widespread occurrence of insider ownership after privatization and a weaker institutional environment 
leading to less effective governance by outside owners in the CIS countries. Finally, the authors noted that about 
one-half of the studies they surveyed did not take into account the endogeneity and selection issues associated with 
ownership and firm performance, and they urged future research to tackle this issue. 
The conclusions of Djankov and Murrell were echoed in Megginson (2005) that also surveyed the 
evidence on the impact of privatization in transition economies. He concluded that “mass” (or voucher) 
privatization, whereby ownership rights were distributed widely and at nominal prices, often led to disappointing 
outcomes, perhaps because this form of privatization was frequently associated with insider ownership. Companies 
where insiders gained control did poorly but firms with “real owners” (financial institutions, foreign corporations, 
or local entrepreneurs) were able to improve their performance. Megginson’s (2005) survey was complemented 
by a short survey by Guriev and Megginson (2006). Both studies related the mixed results on the impact of 
privatization in transition economies to the slow progress in microeconomic and legal reform, especially in CIS 
countries. 
In the present study we report on a number of new results, while providing stronger supporting as well as 
contradictory evidence with respect to some of the previous research. We provide an assessment based on a number 
of important and methodologically strong new studies as well as earlier analyses and we distinguish studies on the 
basis of their sample size, econometric methodology and indicator of performance in order to draw conclusions 
that take these characteristics explicitly into account. Ownership structures have evolved, leading to changes in 
control over firms, and so the emphasis in the literature has to some extent shifted from insider versus outsider and 
concentrated versus dispersed ownership to domestic as against foreign owners. Broadly, we find that privatization 
to foreign owners raises efficiency relative to state owned firms, although in China this result is less clear cut and 
relatively more estimates suggest that private domestic ownership raises TFP. The effect of domestic private 
ownership is by and large also found positive in the CEE region and in Ukraine, but it is quantitatively much 
smaller than that of foreign ownership. Russia appears to be different in that the effect of domestic private and 
mixed ownership is found to be negative or insignificant. Evidence from a recent firm-level data set from 26 
transition economies also suggests that there is an insignificant average (across countries) effect of domestic 
private ownership relative to that of the state ownership. Worker ownership in either CEE or CIS does not seem 
to have a negative effect relative to other forms of private ownership. Finally, data from CEE and CIS suggest that 
new firms appear to be equally or more productively efficient than firms privatized to domestic owners, and foreign 
start-ups appear to be more efficient than domestic ones.  
Turning to other measures of performance, studies of labor productivity find that private ownership has 
a positive or insignificant effect on labor productivity (not controlling for non-labor inputs) in CEE and CIS. In 
terms of profitability, in CEE, CIS the effect of private foreign and domestic ownership on profitability is found 
to be positive or statistically insignificant, with the significance depending on the particular type of ownership. 
Concentrated domestic private ownership, managerial ownership, and to a lesser extent foreign ownership 
generally tend to have a positive effect on profitability, while evidence from CEE also suggests that profitability 
is unaffected when the state keeps a golden share or workers wield more concentrated ownership. Studies of CEE 
and CIS countries indicate that privatization tends to have a positive effect on the scale of operation (sales 
revenues), while studies of the effect of private ownership on the rate of change of scale of operations (from CEE, 
CIS) suggest that this effect is generally not statistically significant.  
Regarding indicators of labor market performance, studies of employment find that privatization in the 
post-communist economies and China is not associated with a reduction in employment, a finding that goes counter 
to many theoretical models, as well as evidence from some developing countries (e.g., Mexico). On the contrary, 
private owners tend to keep employment at higher levels than SOEs, ceteris paribus. Studies of the effects of 
ownership on wages find that state ownership is associated with lower wages in some countries, such as Russia 
and former Czechoslovakia, but not in others, such as Poland. Results from the Czech Republic suggest that there 
is no significant difference in the rate of return on an additional year of education between state-owned, privatized 
and newly established private firms, but that private firms reward university education more than SOEs. In Russia, 
where in the 1990s firms tended to owe wages to their workers, SOEs were more likely to exhibit wage arrears 
than other types of firms. Many studies examined the effect of privatization on other indicators and while the broad 
range of indicators precludes a simple summary, the results exhibit a pattern that is in line with the above measures 
of performance. We provide a more detailed exposition of these findings and our interpretation of them in the 
remainder of this paper. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the experience of privatization in the 
transition economies and more generally around the world, as well as the economic effects of privatization and the 
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principal methodological and data issues encountered in the literature. We also outline the key systemic changes 
and policies that, along with privatization, were advocated and in part or fully carried out during the transition. In 
sections 3 and 4, we examine the macro- and micro-economic evidence about the determinants, extent and impact 
of privatization, and we survey and evaluate the existing literature and attempt to develop a coherent picture of 
how and why privatization has affected national and enterprise economic performance in the transition economies. 
We conclude our study in Section 5 with policy-oriented observations. 
 
2. Policies, Institutions, and Privatization 
While the wisdom and economic effects of privatization in CEE and CIS is currently the subject of intense re-
examination, in the early 1990s privatization was widely considered one of the keystones of the entire transition 
process. The policy arguments were based upon a theoretical foundation (see e.g. Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Bos, 
1991) and successful experience in developed economies, notably the United Kingdom (see Bishop and Kay, 1988; 
Vining and Boardman, 1992). Overall, the findings from studies of developed and middle-income countries, 
surveyed by Megginson and Netter (2001), indicate that privatization could be expected to improve enterprise 
efficiency and profitability. The view that privatization could also be pivotal in the transition process was 
especially strongly advocated by proponents of the so called Washington Consensus, which emphasized fast 
transfer of ownership via privatization and belief that private ownership together with market forces would ensure 
better and more efficient performance of the economy (see e.g. Lipton and Sachs, 1990, and Blanchard, Dornbusch, 
Krugman, Layard, and Summers, 1991). Combined with price liberalization, freedom from state control was seen 
as the way to bring prices into line with opportunity costs and to harden budget constraints (see Kornai, 1990). In 
fact, efficiency was one of the important arguments for privatization as the transfer of ownership rights was seen 
as being crucial for the efficient allocation of resources and long term economic growth. From a political 
perspective, advocated for instance by Andrei Shleifer, privatization was viewed as necessary even if there were 
to be no efficiency improvements. This is because from this perspective the principal reason for privatization was 
to eradicate the command economic system rooted in communist ideology, of which state ownership was the 
backbone. As e.g. Shleifer and Treisman (2005) show, privatization was very successful from the political point 
of view almost from the outset, but most of the empirical work concentrates on efficiency gains. Hence we survey 
the efficiency related arguments in the first sub-section below. 
From the start it was argued that, even from the  perspective of enhancing enterprise efficiency alone, 
privatization on its own would not be sufficient for an effective functioning of emerging market economies. Most 
of the early writers on the subject of optimal strategy of the transition formulated a series of interrelated systemic 
changes and policy reforms that were a prerequisite for successful transition (Svejnar, 1989; Lipton and Sachs, 
1990; Blanchard, Dornbusch, Krugman, Layard, and Summers, 1991; Aghion and Blanchard, 1994). Since the 
impact of privatization was often viewed as being dependent on the presence of other accompanying policies and 
systemic changes, we briefly evaluate these in the second sub-section below. 
Previous surveys highlight two further issues that are likely to influence the character of the privatization 
process, and its impact on enterprise and national economic performance. The vast extent of privatization in the 
transition economies, relative to anything that had ever been attempted before, spawned considerable variation in 
privatization methods within as well as between countries. It was suggested at the time that “bad privatization 
methods”, for example so-called “mass privatization” in which ownership rights were dispersed widely at nominal 
prices, may have led to “bad ownership structures” and therefore reduced the potential gains from privatization. 
We consider privatization methods in the third sub-section, before turning to a critical aspect of institutional 
development, the capital market, by examining the relationship between privatization and stock market 
development in the fourth. 
 
2.1 What Were the Reasons for Privatization? 
The fall of centrally planned economic system and privatization on a global scale represent a complete reversal of 
the long-term efforts in the 19th and 20th centuries to impose either strong regulatory controls on markets or to 
replace markets with planning and state control. Historically state-owned enterprises were established in both the 
socialist and capitalist countries to ensure political control of production, better provision of public goods, more 
effective ways of dealing with externalities, spearheading of economic development in the absence of “well 
functioning” markets, and guaranteeing full employment and equitable income distribution. But the economic 
performance of many SOEs proved disappointing and since the early 1980s privatization started to be advocated 
as a means of establishing clear property rights, providing economic incentives and stimulating superior economic 
performance of firms and economies at large (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). One argument for privatization stresses 
the different objectives and corporate governance of SOEs and privately owned firms. The objective imposed by 
the owner in SOEs is not necessarily consistent with conventionally defined efficiency. For example, SOEs may 
be required to deviate from profit maximization or cost minimization in order to satisfy political objectives, by 
creating or maintaining employment in economically depressed regions or by holding prices below average costs 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.8, 2016 
 
67 
for redistributive reasons (see e.g., Estrin and Perotin, 1991). The politicization of enterprise decision-making may 
also open firms up to lobbying and unproductive rent seeking (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1997). 
Even if the state decides to maximize the profits of the firms that it owns, problems of corporate 
governance may still generate inferior performance in SOEs as compared to privately owned firms. Outside owners 
– whether private or state – do not have full access to the information about corporate performance that is 
concentrated in the hands of managers and when ownership and control are separated, firm-specific rents may be 
used to satisfy manager’s private ambitions (Berle and Means, 1932). However, a private ownership system places 
some constraints on managers’ discretionary behavior -- both external constraints imposed by product and capital 
markets and internal constraints, imposed via statutes, and it is often assumed that it is almost impossible for the 
state as owner to replicate these constraints. 
In most developed economies, the constraints on managerial discretion are usually external to the firm 
and derive from capital markets, which could but often do not have the same effects on SOEs. The quality of 
managerial decision-making is an input in the choices of traders in equity markets, whose judgment on company 
performance is captured in the share price. If the managerial team is thought to be inefficient, the share prices will 
be reduced, putting pressure on managers to improve their performance, ultimately via the market for corporate 
control. Firms that are perceived as performing poorly can be subject to hostile take-over bids. The effectiveness 
of this mechanism depends however on capital market development and the concentration of share ownership. If 
holdings are widely dispersed, owners may face a free rider problem in which the individual returns to monitoring 
by each owner are less than the costs (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This implies that the superiority of private 
ownership after privatization may depend on the degree of ownership concentration. Similarly, it has been 
hypothesized that privatization methods that distribute the private ownership rights to workers, so that ownership 
holdings are highly dispersed and the objectives of the new owners are not necessarily the maximization of profit, 
may also fail to generate superior governance and company performance (see Earle and Estrin, 1996 for a survey). 
The mechanisms to align the incentives of managers and owners in privately owned firms may also 
operate through managerial shareholding and bonus payments (see Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), or as in the 
case of Japan or Germany, through internal constraints, with ownership beings typically highly concentrated into 
the hands of banks, funds or families who are granted board representation and undertake close monitoring of 
enterprise performance directly (see Franks and Mayer, 2001). 
The argument for privatization is based on the notion that SOEs are often not subject to private capital 
market and managerial labor market discipline, and in these circumstances neither the competitively driven 
informational structure nor the market based governance mechanisms such as the market for corporate control can 
be substituted for in full. Moreover, although the government’s ownership stake is concentrated, the state is in 
many cases not directly represented on the boards of public sector companies.  
In many developing economies as well as in some developed countries, family and business group 
ownership remains predominant, and though the ownership structures are typically highly concentrated, this 
ownership form is usually argued to impair company performance relative to outsider ownership structures (see 
Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005). Privatization in some transition economies, especially in the former Soviet 
Union, has led to the emergence of diversified business groups owned by an individual or family (“oligarchs”), 
but the evidence suggests that they may be more efficient that other privatized companies (see Guriev and 
Rachinsky, 2005, and Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko, 2005). 
The above arguments about the benefits of private over state ownership have had particular resonance in 
Central and Eastern Europe, where the failure of the socialist system was closely associated with state ownership 
and planning (see Gregory and Stuart, 2003). In the early phase of the transition, the weak monitoring of managers 
by the state as owner and the absence of external constraints gave management almost total discretion in state 
owned firms to follow their own objectives – rent absorption, asset stripping, employment, social targets – but 
rarely in pursuit of profits, cost reduction or innovation. The governance problems were exacerbated by the 
incentive problems caused by the softness of budget constraints (see Kornai, 1990, Dewatripont, Maskin and 
Roland, 2000; Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003), with poorly performing firms often having easier access to 
external investment funds than the better performing ones (Lizal and Svejnar, 2002). Moreover, Frydman, Gray, 
Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000) have argued that the imposition of hard budget constraints on SOEs will not induce 
revenue restructuring because entrepreneurial incentives associated with outside investor will still be absent. This 
relates to the incomplete contracts ideas of Hart and Moore that have been used to argue that state managers tend 
to make routine decisions whereas private owners would engage in non-routine decisions and stimulate 
entrepreneurship. In the presence of external shocks, privatized firms are hence thought to move more readily into 
new markets and product lines and hence be less likely to lay off workers than SOEs. This suggests that 
privatization might only be effective when control shifts to new owners, who are thereby able to change the 
managers. Barberis et al (1996) find efficiency gains deriving from new owners. As we discuss below, delayed 
privatization can also undermine the performance of the SOEs, since in this situation the incentives of managers 
become to seize assets rather than improve performance. 
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There were of course numerous caveats to the arguments in support of private ownership (see Bos, 1991) 
and these may explain some of our empirical findings below. Laffont and Tirole (1991) noted some of the welfare 
dilemmas when private firms provided public goods and/or had natural monopoly power. If firms have monopoly 
power, then privatizations can be harmful even if the productive efficiency of a firm increases, unless there are 
adequate regulatory controls or sufficiently rapid entry (see also Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1996). Monopoly power 
also creates a dilemma for the state as owner in a privatization process; firms which are privatized with monopoly 
power can be sold for higher prices than if the company is broken up to create a more competitive market structure 
(Estrin, 1994). Similarly, if corporate governance provisions for private firms are lax, company assets can be stolen 
and misallocated. The interaction of privatization and capital markets can be important, with privatized firms 
potentially drawing capital away from more productive new entrants if the lemons problem is more severe for the 
new entrants. Privatized firms with poor governance can undermine confidence in the financial market, thus 
reducing the use of these markets. One can hypothesize however that foreign-owned firms should face fewer of 
these problems, since their governance is set by their parent companies and subject to foreign regulations, while 
their resources are generally provided and monitored by their parent companies. 
 
2.2 Policies in Transition Economies  
Privatization in the transition economies occurred in the context of broader systemic change and this sets the 
institutional and policy context for an evaluation of its impact. Thus, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, policy 
makers formulated initial reform strategies that focused on macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic 
restructuring, along with supporting institutional and political change. Implementation varied across countries in 
both speed and the specifics of what occurred. Almost all transition governments plunged ahead, often in rapid big 
bang style, with what Svejnar (2002a) calls Type I reforms, namely macro stabilization, price liberalization and 
dismantling of the institutions of the communist system. The macroeconomic strategy emphasized restrictive fiscal 
and monetary policies; wage controls and in most cases also a fixed exchange rate. The micro strategy entailed 
moving quickly towards price liberalization for most goods, though usually not energy or housing. Most countries 
opened up rapidly to international trade, thus inducing a more efficient allocation of resources based on world 
market prices, and quickly reduced direct subsidies to SOEs. Finally, they introduced of some elements of a social 
safety net in order to make citizens be more willing to accept the disruptions associated with the introduction of a 
market economy.  
Svejnar’s Type II reforms involved the development and enforcement of laws, regulations and institutions 
that would ensure a successful functioning of a market-oriented economy. These reforms included the privatization 
of large and medium-sized enterprises, but also the establishment and enforcement of a market-oriented legal 
system and accompanying institutions, further development of a viable commercial banking sector and the 
appropriate regulatory infrastructure, labor market regulations, and parameters and institutions related to the 
unemployment, social security and retirement system. It was seen as important to develop and enforce a market 
oriented legal framework that would establish a level playing field, create well-defined property rights, permit the 
enforcement of contracts, and limit corruption. Given the central role of property rights in ensuring effective 
corporate governance in privately owned firms, the institutional framework was likely to be of particular relevance 
in determining the impact of privatization. 
According to the EBRD’s Transition Indicators (EBRD Transition Report, various years) progress in 
developing a market-supporting legal system was everywhere slow, although greater progress in limiting 
corruption and in establishing a functioning legal framework and institutions has been made in the central 
European and Baltic countries. In recent years, an important impetus for carrying out legal and institutional reforms 
in many of these countries has been the need to develop a system that conforms to that of the European Union (EU) 
as a prerequisite for accession (Baldwin, Francois, and Portes, 1997). In the empirical work which follows, 
differences in institutions and policies can be proxied by country and time specific fixed effects, or their impact 
inferred by comparing country specific studies, for example EU Accession countries versus those of the former 
Soviet Union. 
 
2.3 Privatization Methods 
Privatization was undertaken using a large variety of methods, and the literature has suggested that these may have 
influenced the effects on company performance. The need for large scale privatization was recognized from the 
outset with reasons ranging from perceived gains in economic efficiency, to increases in government revenues, to 
political appeal (Svejnar, 1989, Lipton and Sachs, 1990, Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar, 2000). The principal question 
for policy makers centered on the speed of its conduct. The arguments for fast privatization were that (a) price 
liberalization and other reforms would not provide sufficient incentives for SOEs to restructure and become 
competitive, (b) state would not be able to resist intervening in SOEs (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1991; Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1995) and (c) managers would decapitalize firms in the absence of rapid clarification of 
property rights (Frydman, Phelps, Rapaczynski and Shleifer, 1993; Blanchard, Dornbusch, Krugman, Layard, and 
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Summers, 1991). In contrast, Dewatripont and Roland (1992a,b) and Roland (1994) argued that gradual 
privatization was needed because the political backlash to rapid privatization of all firms would be unacceptable. 
In particular, Dewatripont and Roland’s (1992a,b) argument for gradualism was that it allowed the government to 
pursue a strategy that necessitated fewer workers/voters being immediately laid off and that it would reduce 
uncertainty. As we discuss below, however, empirical evidence shows that in most countries privatization did not 
bring about a reduction in employment. 
In approaching the practical aspect of privatization, in addition to the political economy issues noted 
above, there was a major concern that managers could seize state property and claim it as their own through the so 
called popular privatization as occurred early on in Hungary and to some extent the other Central European 
economies (Svejnar, 1989, Lipton and Sachs, 1990). Some also feared that workers would claim ownership of 
their firms (Hinds, 1990, Lipton and Sachs, 1990), although this fear was probably exaggerated (Prasnikar and 
Svejnar, 1991, Ellerman, 1993, Earle and Estrin, 1996). 
In practice, the stock of domestic private savings in these countries was too small to purchase the assets 
being offered and foreign direct investment (FDI) had rarely been available on the scale required (Estrin, 1994). 
This led governments to innovate with privatization methods. Thus, though for selected firms auction or public 
tender methods were used, many countries also experimented with free distribution methods. So-called "mass” 
privatization entailed placing into private hands vouchers of a value sufficient to purchase those state assets to be 
privatized. 
Virtually all privatization strategies facilitated a rapid change in ownership structure in most transition 
economies. With the exceptions of Hungary and Poland, few countries had contained a private sector of any 
significance in 1990. But as early as 1995, the private sector share was already at or above 50 percent in ten 
countries (five countries in Central Europe, three Baltic countries, Bulgaria, and Russia), though in eight former 
republics of the Soviet Union, it remained below 30%. By 2006, the private sector in thirteen additional nations 
had reached above 55 percent of GDP, it reached 45% in Uzbekistan, and only two laggards, Belarus and 
Turkmenistan, still had private sector activity below 25 percent of GDP. 
This remarkable performance should not conceal real concerns about quality of privatization, and 
therefore about its consequences for subsequent private sector performance. For example, though retained state 
shareholdings were small in some of the leading transition economies, the state continued to own significant 
shareholdings in many others. Thus, the Russian state retained more than a 20 percent share in 37 percent of 
privatized firms, and only sold a 100% share in half of them. (Earle and Estrin, 1997). In a 1999 survey of 
privatized firms, EBRD found that in 20 of the 23 countries, the state had retained some shares in around 20% of 
privatized firms, with more than a 20 percent shareholding in around 12 percent of the firms. The state kept a share 
of more than 15 percent of privatized firms in eight countries and more than 30 percent in a further four. Retained 
state ownership has also been a major factor in Chinese privatizations (Tian and Estrin, 2005). Governments have 
also used golden shares to maintain significant influence over the privatized SOEs.  
Mass privatization was also argued to hinder the establishment of effective corporate governance, 
especially if long "agency chains" were created (Stiglitz, 2002). Voucher privatization led to ownership structures 
that were highly dispersed because the entire adult population of the country, or all insiders to each firm, was 
allocated vouchers with which to purchase the shares of the company. In many countries mass privatization also 
initially resulted in majority ownership by insiders. According to Earle and Estrin (1997), in Russia insiders held 
a majority shareholding in 75 percent of firms and outsiders in only 9 percent immediately after privatization in 
1994. Estrin and Wright (1999) show this pattern of extensive insider ownership is also consistent with the 
evidence for other CIS countries. For example, in Ukraine, insiders owned 51 percent of shares in all privatized 
firms in 1997, while outsiders held 38 percent and the state held the rest (Estrin and Rosevear, 1999). Insider 
ownership was predominantly in the hands of workers. However, this probably created limited problems for 
management because worker ownership was highly dispersed. Indeed Blasi, Kroumova and Kruse (1997) argue 
that in Russian employee-owned firms control was effectively in the hands of management. 
However, ownership structures rapidly evolved in favor of outsider ownership, even in the former Soviet 
Union (Estrin and Wright, 1999). The literature (e.g. Djankov and Murrell, 2002) would lead us to expect that the 
method of privatization would also affect the impact of privatization on company performance but this evolution 
of ownership structures in most transition economies, associated with the development of capital markets, suggests 
that these initial effects might not be sustained into the longer term. We consider the developments of capital 
markets below and explore the issue in the empirical sections. 
 
2.4 Privatization and Capital Markets 
The literature suggests that there will be a relationship between stock market development, privatization and post-
privatization performance in transition countries. However, in fact this has not yet been well established. Empirical 
studies by King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), Beck and Levine 
(2004), and Rajan and Zingales (2003) provide evidence of a positive correlation between stock market 
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development and economic growth in developed as well as emerging markets. In the early stages of their 
transformation, the transition economies also needed large amounts of capital for their restructuring and the 
financial sector was weak with banks undercapitalized. The majority of companies were unable to generate profits 
large enough to finance the necessary restructuring through retained earnings, a situation which would call for a 
great deal of reliance on equity financing, to which privatization was intended to provide access. 
However, though development of the capital market in transition countries was partly shaped by 
privatization programs, privatization methods were rarely driven by the objective of developing the capital market. 
For example, direct sales of state assets do not affect stock markets at the time of sale since the shares do not enter 
the market. On other hand, privatizing state assets through the stock market provides liquidity and enhances 
transparency. As a consequence of the mass privatization programs, large numbers of shares were put on the market 
without reference to listing requirements. 
Stock markets transition economies during the 1990s were often characterized by insufficient regulation, 
institutional fragility and weak minority shareholder protection (EBRD 1998; Bonin and Wachtel, 2003).Yet the 
literature has rarely considered the connection between the privatization method employed and the consequent 
functioning of the capital market. Not only does the success of certain privatization methods depend on the 
existence of a capital market, but as we have seen the methods also determine the post-privatization ownership 
structure as further trading of shares evolves. The inter-relationship between privatization and capital market 
development has been analyzed by Fungacova and Hanousek (2006). They use data over the period 1990-2003 
from the majority of transition economies to test whether and in what ways privatization has influenced capital 
market development. They show that while market capitalization to GDP increased suddenly following mass 
privatization, most of these new shares were traded only occasionally or not at all, and this illiquidity became more 
pronounced over time. In countries which used mass privatization, the capital market did not initially fulfill its 
function of providing capital resources to enterprises. 
Despite this unpromising beginning, development of the main stock indices in the transition economies 
has recently begun to show improvement. This is in part because the main listed companies on these markets have 
in recent years been the target of developing domestic pension funds, as well as investors from developed 
economies. Capital market evolution has also influenced ownership structure. While some of the studies discussed 
below specifically control for capital market development, this important issue is usually conflated with broader 
institutional development and with privatization methods. 
 
3. Determinants, Extent and Effects of Privatization 
In this section we discuss the principal hypotheses and results of corresponding empirical tests with respect to (a) 
the determinants and sequencing of privatizations and (b) the effect of privatization on economic performance at 
both the national and enterprise level. The sequencing issue is of importance in understanding the issues of 
selection and endogeneity which affect studies evaluating the impact of privatization on company performance. 
 
3.1 The Determinants, Sequencing and Extent of Privatization 
The number of studies examining the determinants, sequencing and extent of privatization, whether in developing 
or developed countries, is relatively limited. Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2000) examine theoretically and empirically 
the determinants of the sequencing of privatization. They note that an important fact that stands out in all large-
scale privatizations is that no government has privatized all SOEs simultaneously. Even in countries that strove to 
privatize rapidly, (e.g., the Czech Republic, Estonia, Russia, Slovakia, and the Ukraine), the process consisted of 
a sequence of moves, with some firms being privatized earlier than others. The authors point out that government 
may sequence privatization of SOEs because (a) it may incur excessively high transaction and congestion costs if 
it tries to privatize all firms simultaneously, (b) it wants to reveal information about the firms to investors (later 
buyers may observe the quality of the firms sold earlier) if there is uncertainty about the quality of the firms being 
privatized, (c) it wants to avoid political opposition to dramatic reforms and possibly increase the feasibility of 
future reforms (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995), and (d) it wants to avoid costly unemployment (Aghion and 
Blanchard, 1994, and Katz and Owen, 1993). 
Given that governments privatize sequentially, the question arises as to which firms they choose to 
privatize first. A number of models have been developed to capture alternative government objectives that yield 
predictions about the government’s sequencing strategy (see Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 2000). Glaeser and 
Scheinkman (1996) for instance examine sequencing strategies that would increase efficiency and argue that a 
primary advantage of private ownership is that it enhances efficiency by improving firms’ acquisition of, and 
responsiveness to, information. In their model private firms respond to demand and cost shocks, but this 
information is unobserved or ignored by public firms. In particular, the authors assume that private firms (unlike 
SOEs) observe the actual values and adjust their production when demand and cost conditions change. Thus if the 
government is concerned about increasing efficiency in this sense, the Glaeser-Scheinkman model predicts that 
privatization should begin where demand or cost volatility is the greatest and where it maximizes the flow of 
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information. Thus when demand uncertainty is greater than cost uncertainty, the authors argue that downstream 
firms should be privatized before upstream firms because downstream firms are better positioned to transmit 
information between the retail and upstream sectors. Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) also note that the 
informational gains from privatization may be offset by a loss of consumer surplus if firms with significant market 
power are privatized and allowed to engage in monopoly pricing. 
Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2000) examine theoretically and empirically the following competing 
government objectives: i) maximizing Pareto efficiency through resource allocation; ii) maximizing public 
goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; iii) minimizing political costs stemming from 
unemployment; iv) maximizing efficiency through information gains (Glaeser-Scheinkman) and v) maximizing 
privatization revenues. They use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing theoretical 
predictions about the sequencing of privatization and find strong evidence that the government privatized first 
firms that were more profitable, firms in downstream industries, and firms in industries subject to greater demand 
uncertainty. Privatizing more profitable firms first is inconsistent with maximizing Pareto efficiency but it is 
consistent with the model of maximizing privatization revenues, maximizing public goodwill and minimizing the 
political cost of unemployment. However, the implication of the political cost model that employment growth in 
the firm’s industry should affect sequencing is not supported by the results. Gupta, Ham and Svejnar’s (2000) 
finding that firms in downstream industries and in industries with greater demand uncertainty were more likely to 
be privatized early suggests that the government placed emphasis on efficiency in the Glaeser and Scheinkman 
(1996) sense, namely by privatizing first firms that required flexible management. However, in contrast to the 
Glaeser and Scheinkman’s recommendation, but consistent with the general evidence regarding profitability, firms 
with higher market share were more likely to be privatized first. 
Privatization, by divesting the state of key productive assets, is an unavoidably political process. Political 
configurations can influence the pace and timing of privatization, as was found by Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003) in 
their study of 21 OECD countries over the period 1977-2002. In particular, the authors found that political 
fragmentation gave several groups the opportunity to veto or otherwise block large-scale privatization, and hence 
delay or even halt the process. Politics also played a part in influencing privatization methods, with governments 
seeking popular support often favoring methods that dispersed share ownership. 
Politics can also influence the privatization method by requiring the government to retain significant 
ownership stakes post-privatization. Depending on the extent of such stakes, in effect ownership is transferred 
without (full) control. Bortolotti and Faccio (2004) studied this phenomenon of retained state ownership stakes by 
examining the evolution of control structures in 141 privatized firms in OECD countries. They found that in 2000, 
governments were the largest stakeholder or held special control powers (e.g. a golden share) in 62.4% of these 
privatized firms. Contrary to what one might have expected, however, they found no evidence that these 
government stakes adversely affected either firms’ performance or their market valuations. 
Overall, the theoretical models and hypotheses about determinants and sequencing of privatization, and 
Gupta, Ham and Svejnar’s (2000) econometric evidence, suggest that firms are not assigned for privatization at 
random. This in turn implies that studies that treat the allocation of firms for privatization as random or do not 
adequately control for the non-random selection are likely to overstate the positive effect of privatization on 
performance. Djankov and Murrell’s (2002) survey for instance indicates that 47 percent of pre-2003 studies 
analyzing the impact of privatization on firm performance in the transition economies suffer from this problem. 
Realizing this shortcoming, Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2000) analyze the problem that arises in the studies that 
ignore the fact that better firms may be privatized first and they show that even one of the most popular methods 
for controlling for selection or endogeneity in the existing studies, namely a difference-in-difference estimation 
(equivalent to fixed effects) approach, is unlikely fully to address this problem. Hence at least one-half and possibly 
a vast majority of the entire literature on privatization suffer from a problem of potential selection (endogeneity) 
bias. The general understanding of the effects of privatization and the ongoing policy work may hence be based 
on flawed information, a point that we illustrate in the empirical section of this paper. 
In addition to sequencing, there are a number of competing theoretical models of the desirable extent of 
privatization. Fershtman (1990) analyzed the interdependence between the ownership status and market structure. 
He examined a duopolistic market, considered the implications of privatization on the attractiveness of entry, the 
possibility of deterring entry, and the incumbent’s position as a natural monopoly. He demonstrated that a partly 
state-owned firm might realize higher profits than its private, profit-maximizing, competitor. This implies that 
partial rather than full privatization may be desirable in the conditions of imperfect competition, which is a feature 
of the early transition stage. 
McFaul (1995) reviews early transition events in Russia and argues that future progress in developing 
private property rights will require not only sound economic policies but also more robust state institutions. Based 
on this exercise, he claims that the set of political institutions comprising the first post-communist Russian state 
was not capable of either dismantling Soviet institutions governing property rights or creating or supporting new 
market-based economic institutions regarding private property. The conclusion based on his work is that the extent 
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of privatization ought to be limited. 
Leamer and Taylor (1994) develop a Bayesian pooling technique to estimate aggregate production 
functions for the previously centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and for Western economies, as well 
as for a group of developing countries. This technique adjusts for the low quality of the data from planned 
economies and also possible differences between centrally planned, Western and developing country technologies. 
The authors find that if the transferability of assets to the new technology is low and Western capital is unavailable, 
it may be better not to privatize than to have full (big-bang) privatization. Large-scale privatization is also less 
desirable if Western capital is available for new projects. Thus, in some instances it may be desirable to use 
Western support to slow the rate of privatization rather than hasten it. This study predicts that large scale 
privatization may be more desirable in the CEE countries than the CIS ones because western capital is at least 
initially more available for the former than the latter. 
 
3.2 Privatization, Growth and Other Aggregate Outcomes 
A number of theoretical models provided competing predictions about the effects of privatization on macro-
economic performance and growth, with some envisioning the effect being positive, some negative and some 
ambiguous. In Gylfason (1998), privatization is shown to increase national economic output in a two-sector full-
employment general-equilibrium model by enhancing efficiency as if a relative price distortion were being 
removed through price reform, trade liberalization, or stabilization. Gylfason shows that the static output gain from 
privatization may be large and the potential dynamic output gain from privatization also appears to be substantial. 
Hansen (1997) uses a general equilibrium imperfect competition model to show that a broad distribution of 
ownership rights can have favorable influence on micro-economic efficiency and may therefore lead to a 'good' 
aggregate outcome. Sales to single or core investors, if accompanied by workers' equity shares, may perform worse. 
Furthermore only a so called Big Bang rapid approach to privatization might lead to favorable outcomes. 
Several studies use aggregate data to assess the effect of privatization on economic performance. Using 
data from thirty five developing market economies over the 1988-1992 period and employing Probit and Tobit 
models to identify the determinants of successful privatization programs, Plane (1997) finds that privatization 
(through divestiture) has a significant positive effect on economic growth and that the effect is stronger when 
privatization takes place in industry or infrastructure rather than in other sectors. This study hence considers sector 
of the firm (infrastructure, industry, and services) as the determinant of privatization while also including variables 
to control for macroeconomic development (prices, exchange rate, current account). It suggests that if economic 
performance is the goal of the government, privatization should occur in industry and infrastructure first. 
Berkowitz and De Jong (2001) analyze whether regional differences in reform policies in Russia can 
account for regional differences in growth rates and conclude that to a considerable degree they can. The authors 
find that regions with more large-scale privatization exhibit greater formation of new (legally registered) 
enterprises, which in turn exhibits a strong positive correspondence with growth. 
Privatization and economic growth may also be related through fiscal performance. Barnett (2000) uses 
macroeconomic and privatization data from 18 countries to find that privatization proceeds transferred to the 
budget tend to be saved and used to reduce domestic financing. His other main finding is that total privatization, 
as opposed to just the proceeds transferred to the budget, is correlated with an improvement in macroeconomic 
performance as manifested by higher real GDP growth and lower unemployment. However, this result needs to be 
interpreted cautiously as the evidence is not establishing causality. 
In a cross-country aggregate study, Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs (2001) use a panel data set from 25 transition 
countries over a period 1990-1998. The dataset includes a series of indicators representing the components of the 
depth of privatization and progress in transition. They find that privatization does not by itself increase GDP 
growth, but they suggest that a positive effect is present when privatization is accompanied by hard budget 
constraints and in-depth institutional reforms. 
Bennett, Estrin and Urga (2007) focus on privatization methods and use an expanded Solow-Barro 
empirical growth framework, in which GDP growth is associated with growth in factor inputs (capital, labor and 
human capital) and a number of other variables including capital market and private sector development. The 
authors use a panel data model and GMM estimation methods for almost all the transition economies (26 countries) 
for the period from 1991 to 2003. They find that countries which used mass privatization enjoyed significantly 
higher growth post-privatization relative to pre-privatization compared to countries which used other privatization 
methods. They use a variety if alternative specification as well as country specific fixed effects to control for 
possible alternative explanations of their finding. Their study suggests that, as predicted by policy advisors at the 
time, the advantage of speed in privatization brought about by mass privatization may have yielded benefits in 
terms of economic growth. Contrary to the expectations of many advisors and results of the early studies surveyed 
by Megginson (2005), however, the analysis of Bennett, Estrin and Urga (2007) suggests that mass privatization 
was superior to other privatization methods as far as the effect on growth is concerned. 
Using similar data, Gouret (2007) in turn provides complementary evidence showing that mass 
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privatization resulted in a smaller positive effect on the level of GDP than the more gradual methods of 
privatization. Gouret also runs similar regressions as Bennett et al. (2007), using macroeconomic stabilization and 
reform dummy variables rather than inputs as controls. In these specifications he usually cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the effects of different forms of privatization on growth are not different from one another. 
Since in a number of economies pre-privatization firms were to a large extent controlled by workers, 
Albrecht and Thum (1994) discuss strategy for economies in transition to get through a potentially destabilizing 
phase. Based on their theoretical model they predict that policy measures such as labor participation with wage 
ceilings can help avoid the destructive trend towards mass bankruptcy with negative macroeconomic impact. 
 
4. Micro Theory and Evidence 
A theoretical analysis and overview of privatization and firm performance in transition is provided by Roland 
(2000). Surveys of firm-level studies examining the effects of privatization on firm performance range from ones 
that find a large variation of outcomes but no systematically significant effect of privatization on performance 
(Bevan, Estrin and Schaffer, 1999) to those cautiously concluding that privatization improves firm performance 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001), to ones that are fairly confident that privatization tends to improve performance 
(Shirley and Walsh, 2001, and Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
This variation in the interpretation of results is brought about in part by the fact that the early studies had 
access to different and often somewhat limited data on firm ownership. For these reasons, many studies treat 
ownership as a relatively simple categorical concept and some are often unable to distinguish the exact extent of 
ownership by individual owners or even relatively homogeneous groups of owners. Equally important, the 
diversity of interpretations and findings is generated by three types of interrelated analytical problems that may be 
expected in early studies in the context of the rapidly changing transition economies. First, the early studies rely 
on short time periods with observations concentrated immediately before and after privatization. Second, the early 
studies (a) use small and often unrepresentative samples of firms, (b) are frequently unable to identify accurately 
ownership because privatization is still ongoing or because the frequent post-privatization changes of ownership 
are hard to detect, and (c) often combine panel data from different accounting systems. Third, as we have discussed 
above, many of the early studies have not been able to control adequately for the selection/endogeneity problem 
of ownership and their estimates of the effects of privatization may hence be biased. 
In view of these problems, we have enlarged the survey of privatization studies reported by Djankov and 
Murrell (2002), hereafter D-M, with studies that have been published or circulated as working papers by November 
2006, and we have taken into account pertinent information about the data and econometric techniques used by 
the various authors. The overlap between the studies of CEE and CIS that we evaluate and those covered by D-M 
is as follows: on total factor productivity we deal with 21 studies, D-M with 6 studies and we overlap on 4 studies; 
on labor productivity we cover 24 studies, D-M 11 and we overlap on 9; on profitability we draw on 13 studies, 
D-M on 2 and we overlap on 1; on sales and revenues we deal with 18 studies, D-M with 8 and we overlap on 3; 
on employment we draw on 18 studies, while D-M do not study the effect on this variable; on wages we evaluate 
6 studies, D-M 2 and we overlap on 2; and on other measures of performance we deal with 34 studies; D-M with 
15, and we overlap on 5. Many studies have hence come on stream since the publication of the D-M paper. 
Moreover, some of the papers cited in D-M were working papers that came up with somewhat different estimates 
in the final published versions. 
Since the studies are heterogeneous with respect to their methodologies and the nature of the data used, 
we classify studies as belonging to category 1, 2 or 3, with category 1 (C1) containing studies that employ at least 
fixed effects or use instrumental variables (IVs) to handle the selection/endogeneity problem in ownership and 
have a relatively large sample size (which we define as at least 200 firms in large and medium-sized countries, or 
at least 75 firms in small countries such as Slovenia), category 2 (C2) including studies that use fixed effects or 
IVs but work with smaller sample sizes than studies in C1, and category 3 (C3) having studies that use OLS with 
any sample size. In our evaluation, we place emphasis on studies in C1 and to a lesser extent C2. 
In assessing the effects of privatization, we examine the effects on total factor productivity or TFP, labor 
productivity, profitability, sales and revenues – capturing the scale of operation, employment, wages, and other 
indicators of performance.  
 
4.1 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
Productive efficiency, or total factor productivity, is of major interest since the communist economies collapsed 
in large part because of their increasing inability to sustain innovation and technical progress. In particular, central 
planners were relatively capable of mobilizing labor and capital resources through compulsory full employment 
and high rates of investment, but they had hard time increasing the amount of output that SOEs generated from 
any given inputs. As a result, a major expectation during the transition has been that firms would increase their 
TFP. 
We have identified 22 studies that analyze the impact of ownership on TFP or rate of change of TFP in 
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the transition economies, using value added, total product or sales revenues as the dependent variable and either 
dummy variables or percent share ownership as measures of different types of ownership. As may be seen from 
panel A of 14 studies belong to C1, 3 to C2 and 5 to C3. A number of studies have simply examined the differential 
effect of state versus private ownership, while others examine the effects of other sub-categories of ownership. 
The studies cover both the CEE and CIS regions. 
With the possible exception of Russia, studies in C1 and C2 find the effect of private relative to state 
ownership to be positive or non-negative. Moreover, studies that break private ownership into several categories 
show that the overall private v. state ownership dichotomy subsumes different private ownership effects. Except 
for two of the three studies of Slovenia, all studies uniformly suggest that privatization to foreign owners increases 
efficiency. This effect of foreign ownership is strong and robust across regions. The effect of domestic private 
ownership is by and large also found positive in the CEE region and in Ukraine, but it is quantitatively much 
smaller than that of foreign ownership (the quantitative effects are not shown in a tabular form). Russia appears to 
be different from Ukraine in that Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell (2005) and Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006) 
find with large data sets the effect of domestic private and mixed ownership to be negative or insignificant. 
Similarly, Commander and Svejnar (2007) use a large firm-level data set from 26 transition economies and find 
an insignificant average (across countries) effect of domestic private ownership relative to that of the state 
ownership. In general, the effect of domestic private ownership appears to be more positive in the CEE region than 
in the CIS. 
Compared to the D-M survey that found the effect of private ownership to be positive in CEE but 
insignificant in CIS, we hence find a strong positive effect of foreign ownership in both the CEE and CIS regions, 
and a quantitatively smaller positive effect of domestic private ownership in CEE and in Ukraine (together with a 
negative effect in Russia). The reason for finding a stronger positive effect than D-M is in part that we are focusing 
on studies in categories C1 and C2 that take into account the problem of selection/endogeneity of ownership, 
whereas the earlier surveys did not place as much emphasis on this issue. Indeed, the studies that we report in 
category C3 generate much more diverse effects, with a number of the estimated OLS coefficients on private 
(domestic and foreign) ownership being negative or insignificant. Another reason for our stronger and more 
uniform findings of positive effects of private ownership may be that more of our studies cover recent years and 
privatization may take a few years to have an effect as strong owners take control and markets start to function. 
Finally, institutional development is a slow process and more recent data may pertain to a more developed legal 
and institutional setting in most of the transition economies. 
Several studies examine concentration of ownership and find that it plays an important part, with majority 
private ownership having mostly positive effects on TFP. The overall positive effect is again driven primarily by 
foreign owned firms. The effect of majority domestic private ownership tends to be positive as well, but it tends 
to be smaller in magnitude. As before, the effect is found to be positive in Ukraine but negative in Russia. Overall, 
we hence find qualified support for the hypothesis that concentrated private ownership tends to increase efficiency 
more than dispersed ownership. 
Two studies distinguish between privatized SOEs and newly created private firms. Sabirianova, Svejnar, 
and Terrell (2005) use 1992-2000 firm-level data for almost all industrial firms in the Czech Republic and Russia 
and find that foreign start-ups are less efficient than existing foreign owned firms, but more efficient than domestic 
start-ups, which are in turn more efficient than existing domestic firms. This study hence suggests that new firms 
tend to be more efficient than firms privatized to domestic owners. Using 2002 and 2005 firm-level data from 26 
transition economies, Commander and Svejnar (2007) find that domestic start up firms are less efficient than 
foreign owned firms but not significantly different from domestic privatized or state-owned firms. The two studies 
hence suggest that de novo firms are more productive than or at least as productive as SOEs privatized to domestic 
owners. 
Studies that examine the dynamics of productive efficiency show that foreign-owned firms improved 
efficiency faster than domestic private and state-owned firms in the 1990s and early 2000s. This differential effect 
is not detectable, however, in Commander and Svejnar’s (2007) study of the 2002-2005 panel data from the 26 
transition economies. It is hence possible that foreign owners brought about a sizable increase in efficiency in the 
period immediately after acquiring the local firms in the 1990s, but that later on the rate of change in efficiency 
has been on average similar in all the principal types of ownership of firms. 
In view of the above results, the question naturally arises as to why the TFP effect of privatization to 
domestic owners has been much smaller than the TFP effect of privatization to foreign investors. Discussions with 
managers, policy makers and analysts suggest three leading possible explanations. The finding may reflect in part 
the limited skills and access to world markets on the part of the local managers. Domestically owned privatized 
firms are also the ones where performance-reducing activities such as looting, tunneling and defrauding of minority 
shareholders have been most frequent. Finally, in a number of countries the nature of the privatization process 
initially prevented large domestic private owners from obtaining 100% ownership stakes and insiders or the state 
often owned sizeable holdings. It often took these large shareholders several years to squeeze out minority 
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shareholders and in the process the large shareholders sometimes artificially decreased the performance of their 
newly acquired firms in order to squeeze out the minority shareholders at low share prices. 
The existing privatization studies also provide information about the effect of employee (insider) 
ownership on efficiency. There has been a major debate about whether employee ownership and control are 
associated with lower or higher efficiency and excessive use of labor (labor hoarding). We have found seven 
studies that examine the effect of employee ownership on TFP. Six estimates from both CEE and CIS countries 
are statistically insignificant and one (Estonia) shows a positive effect of employee ownership on TFP. These 
results are different from those of D-M who find the overall effect of employee ownership on performance to be 
insignificant in CEE and negative in CIS. One reason for this discrepancy may be the aforementioned limited 
overlap between our and D-M studies in this area. Moreover, D-M report that “the results for managers and workers 
show a considerable degree of sensitivity to how selection bias is handled”, while we focus on studies that handle 
the issue of selection (categories C1 and C2). Finally, D-M recalculate some estimates (e.g., in their Table 1) for 
the sake of comparability across studies, while we present the effects as reported in the original studies. 
Simoneti, Damijan, Rojec, and Majcen (2005) use Slovenian data to test for the effect of a firm being 
listed or not listed on a stock exchange, relative to being government controlled. They find that the TFP effect of 
being listed is positive, while being privately controlled and non-listed has no significant effect relative to state 
control. This study hence supports the hypothesis that listing induces monitoring, better corporate governance and 
superior performance. 
As mentioned in the introduction, we have also surveyed the ownership-related studies that have been 
carried out on data from China. Probably because privatization is a relatively recent phenomenon in China, a 
number of studies, including Jefferson and Rawski (1996), address TFP issues with firm level data but do not 
examine differences in TFP related to privatization or ownership. As may be seen from Panel B, studies that 
address these issues find diverse results, with the effect of non-state ownership being mostly positive but 
sometimes statistically insignificant and sometimes negative. Thus Jefferson and Su (2006) use a large sample of 
firms (N > 20,000) and show that the effect of private joint stock ownership on the level of TFP is positive. Hu, 
Song, and Zhang (2004) in turn use a much smaller sample of firms in selected regions (N > 700) and find the 
effects of cooperative as well as domestic and foreign private ownership to have a positive effect on the level of 
productivity. Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins (2006) use a relatively large sample of firms (N > 4,000) and find 
the effect of domestic private, collective and complete foreign ownership on the level of productivity to be 
statistically insignificant, the effect of foreign joint ventures to be positive, unreformed state ownership negative, 
and reformed state ownership positive. Finally, Dong, Putterman, and Unel (2006) use firm-level data from 
Nanjing (N = 165) to examine the effect on the rate of change of TFP, and they find the effect of state urban 
ownership to be positive, while the effect of state rural and both private urban and private rural ownership is found 
to be insignificant. 
The TFP studies of CEE, CIS and China, hence generate a variety of results. The CEE and CIS results 
suggest that privatization to foreign owners rather than domestic ones raises efficiency relative to state owned 
firms. In China, this result is less clear cut and relatively more estimates suggest that private domestic ownership 
raises TFP, though not the rate of change of TFP. Similarly, concentrated (especially foreign) private ownership 
has a stronger positive effect than dispersed ownership in CEE and CIS, but foreign joint ventures rather than 
wholly owned foreign firms have a positive effect on TFP level in China. Worker ownership in CEE and CIS 
(collective ownership in China) does not seem to have a negative effect relative to other forms of private ownership. 
Finally, data from CEE and CIS suggest that new firms appear to be equally or more efficient than firms privatized 
to domestic owners and foreign start-ups appear to be more efficient than domestic ones. 
 
4.2 Labor Productivity 
Estimates of the effect of ownership on labor productivity (not controlling for the use of others inputs) are based 
on twenty four studies, with 8 belonging to category C1 and 6 to category C2. The results of these studies have a 
less clear-cut interpretation since differences across types of firms could be due to different efficiency or simply 
to different non-labor (especially capital) factor intensity. 
the findings of C1 and C2 studies are similar to the TFP results in that they suggest that the effect of 
private ownership is primarily positive or insignificant. Similarly, as in the case of TFP, foreign ownership and 
concentrated ownership are found to have a positive or insignificant effect, while the effects of employee and 
management ownership are estimated to be mostly statistically insignificant.  Finally, newly established firms are 
found to have lower labor productivity than others in some studies but not in others, but this may be brought about 
by a scale effect. Using the population of large and medium sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hanousek, Kočenda, 
and Svejnar (2007) find that ownership by domestic industrial companies and investment funds generates lower 
labor productivity than all other types of ownership (including state) and that ownership by foreign industrial 
companies has a positive productivity effect. Government retention of a golden share (veto power over certain key 
decisions) appears to have an insignificant effect. 
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4.3 Profitability 
Profitability can be a very important indicator of company performance, although in the transition economies, as 
in many other developing countries, profits may be underreported by firms to evade taxes, and may reflect market 
power as well as technical efficiency. As may be seen from Panel A, the effects of ownership on profitability or 
rate of change of profitability have been examined in thirteen studies, 6 of which belong to category C1, and 4 to 
C2. Most studies use data from the Czech Republic and Ukraine, but some use data from Belarus, Bulgaria, FYR 
Macedonia, and Russia. 
Foreign ownership tends to have a positive or insignificant effect on the level of profit, while the few 
studies that look at the effect of foreign ownership on the rate of change of profitability find it to be insignificant. 
The effect of domestic private ownership is also for the most part positive or insignificant. The effect varies across 
types of ownership (bank, investment fund, individual, etc.), with the positive effects in the case of foreign owners 
being brought about by industrial (non-financial) companies as owners, while in the case of domestic owners it is 
usually some form of financial ownership that generates positive effects on profit. In this finer categorization, 
however, the effects vary across studies. Interestingly, using data from the Czech Republic, Weiss and Nikitin 
(2002) find a positive effect of national (state) ownership on the rate of change of both operating profit per worker 
and operating profit per unit of capital, as well as a positive effect of municipal ownership on the rate of change 
of operating profit per worker. Using data of the publicly traded firms in the Czech Republic during 1993-1995, 
Hanousek and Kočenda (2003) in turn find a positive effect of foreign majority ownership on the rate of change 
in returns on assets. Finally, Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2007) find positive effect of the subsequent 
ownership by banks on change in ROA but this effect is offset by negative effect of change in ownership. Foreign 
industrial owners exhibit positive effect of initial ownership on profit over sales, while effect of subsequent 
ownership by others foreign owners is negative. Overall, profitability is not significantly affected by the state 
keeping a golden share. 
Three studies in categories C1 and C2 look at ownership concentration. In the Czech Republic, Hanousek, 
Kočenda, and Svejnar (2007) find no effect of concentration that results from the initial large scale privatization, 
but they find a positive effect of majority ownership by domestic private owners as a result of ownership changes 
that took place after privatization. In terms of foreign ownership, the authors do not find any effect of high 
(majority) concentration among foreign owners, but do find that strong (blocking) minority (33-49%) foreign 
ownership has a positive effect on return on assets. Miller (2006) finds the effect of concentrated ownership on 
return on assets to be positive in Bulgaria, while Simoneti and Gregoric (2004) find concentrated management 
(but not employees) ownership to have a positive effect on profit/sales in Slovenia.  Hence, concentrated domestic 
private ownership, managerial ownership, and to a lesser extent foreign ownership tend to have a positive effect 
on profitability, while state keeping a golden share or concentration of worker ownership appear to be unrelated 
to profitability. 
 
4.4 Sales and Revenues 
Estimated effects of different types of ownership on sales or revenues (capturing the scale of operation) are 
reported. The estimated coefficients are based on 20 studies, with 8 of them in category C1, and 6 in category C2. 
Some studies use sales and some the rate of change of sales as their dependent variable. Most of the C1 and C2 
studies find private ownership to have a positive effect on the level of sales, suggesting that private ownership 
results in an increase in the scale of operations. Studies examining the effect of privatization on the rate of change 
of sales show that the effect is mostly insignificant but positive in the case of ownership by foreign industrial firm 
(Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar, 2007) and ownership by outsiders and domestic as well as foreign financial 
firms (Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 1999; Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski 2000). The effect is 
insignificant for ownership by insiders, domestic non-financial firms, and domestic individuals. Studies in category 
3 find both of the above effects to be statistically weaker and occasionally negative. 
Studies of China deal with the effect of ownership on the rate of change in sales or revenues per worker. 
The results are summarized in Panel B. Using their Nanjing data, Dong, Putterman, and Unel (2006) find that the 
effects of state urban and state rural ownerships on the rate of change of revenues per worker are positive, while 
those of private urban and private rural ownership are statistically insignificant. These results suggest that state 
ownership results in a faster rate of increase of the scale of operation than private ownership. Jia, Sun, and Tong 
(2005) find the effect of state minority ownership on the change in real sales to be insignificant but do not report 
other categories of ownership and do not specify a base. On other hand, Sun and Tong (2003) estimate this effect 
to be negative for state majority ownership, insignificant for foreign majority ownership and positive for 
companies listed on the stock exchange. 
Overall, the studies of CEE and CIS countries indicate that privatization tends to have a positive effect 
on the scale of operation, while studies of the effect of private ownership on the rate of change of scale of operations 
(from CEE, CIS and China) suggest that this effect is not statistically significant except in some well defined 
categories of ownership. 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.8, 2016 
 
77 
4.5 Employment 
The effect of privatization on employment, like on revenues, is an indicator of the extent of restructuring brought 
about through privatization. As such, it provides an important empirical link to the theoretical models of transition. 
Seventeen studies have examined the effect of ownership on employment or rate of change of employment, with 
thirteen of them belonging to categories C1 or C2. As may be seen from Panel A, there is a tendency for privatized 
firms, especially those with foreign owners, to increase or not to reduce employment relative to firms with state 
ownership, ceteris paribus. In the early-to-mid 1990s, when employment was falling in many transition economies, 
this relationship amounted to a smaller or similar decline in employment in the privately owned, especially foreign 
owned, firms as in the SOEs. This is very different from the negative employment effect found in the Mexican 
privatized firms by LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999). An interesting result is a time pattern related to 
privatization and employment in Polish firms identified by Mickiewicz, Gerry, and Bishop (2005) who show no 
significant effect on employment in the first three years after privatization, a significant positive effect about 3-6 
years after privatization, and no significant effect afterwards. 
In general, employee ownership and control do not have a significant effect on employment, providing 
parallel evidence to the TFP studies that this form of ownership does not result in excess employment. 
Using a large 1980-90 sample of firms in China, Lane, Broadman, and Singh (1998) find a negative effect 
of the state and collective ownership on both job creation and job destruction (Panel B) but no control group is 
presented. The effect on job destruction appears to be marginally larger than that of the job creation but the authors 
did not formally test for a difference between the two effects. In a C3 paper, Wei, Varela, D’Souza, and Hassan 
(2003) examine the effect of state and private foreign ownership in newly privatized firms on the change in 
employment over the 1990-1997 period. They find that state ownership has a negative employment effect, while 
the effect in the case of newly privatized firms with foreign ownership is insignificant. 
 
4.6 Wages 
Studies of the effects of ownership on wages (3 in category C1 and 2 in category C3) find that state ownership is 
associated with lower wages in some countries, such as Russia and former Czechoslovakia, but not in others, such 
as Poland. Munich, Svejnar and Terrell’s (2005) study of the rate of return to human capital in the Czech Republic 
suggests that there is no significant difference in the rate of return on an additional year of education between state-
owned, privatized and newly established private firms, but that private firms reward university education more 
than SOEs. Private firms also tend to have steeper and more concave experience-earnings profiles – paying higher 
returns on a year of experience to employees with low experience (recent entrants into the labor market) and lower 
returns to the more experienced (older) workers. 
In Russia, where in the 1990s firms tended to owe wages to their workers, SOEs were more likely to 
exhibit wage arrears than firms with domestic and foreign private ownership, firms with mixed ownership and de 
novo firms (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002, Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti, 1999). Hence, during this period 
private ownership was associated with a greater adherence to labor contracts than state ownership. 
 
4.7 Other Indicators of Performance 
At least 35 studies have analyzed the effect of ownership on other dependent variables (8 in category C1 and 11 
in category C2;). The following patterns of private ownership effects seem to be broadly supported by the data: (a) 
private ownership tends to result in higher exports and greater efficiency, as measured by the cost of inputs relative 
to sales, Tobin’s Q, and soft budget constraints, (b) foreign firms tend to restructure and sell assets more than 
others (Djankov, 1999b), are more likely to pay dividends (Bena and Hanousek, 2006), and are less likely to default 
on debt (Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 2000). Despite the fact that the broad range of indicators used in the 
studies precludes a unified summary, the results exhibit a pattern that is in line shown by other indicators. 
 
5. Concluding Observations 
The transformation of the former communist countries from almost completely state-owned to mostly privately-
owned economies is one of the more fundamental events in recent economic history. Given the relatively poor 
performance of the centrally planned economies before the transition, most policy makers expected privatization 
to result in improved economic performance. As it turned out, the post-communist countries went through a deep 
recession in the first three to eight years of the transition, a period that usually coincided with the launch of 
privatization. Yet, they have been among the fastest growing economies in the last ten to fifteen years. There is 
some preliminary evidence that these phenomena may be related. The effects of privatization on performance at 
the micro-economic level is on the whole positive, but not uniformly so. The fact that firms have not been assigned 
for privatization at random also makes unbiased econometric inference difficult. Better firms seem to have been 
assigned for privatization first, thus making it likely that OLS estimates comparing the performance of privatized 
and non-privatized firms overestimate the positive effect of privatization. There is relatively clear evidence that 
privatization to foreign owners raises efficiency relative to that of state-owned firms. The effect of domestic private 
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ownership is by and large also positive in the CEE region and in Ukraine, but it is quantitatively much smaller 
than that of foreign ownership. Russia (and possibly other CIS countries that have not been rigorously analyzed) 
is different in that the performance effect of privatization to domestic owners is found to be negative or 
insignificant. In addition, concentrated (especially foreign) private ownership has a stronger positive effect on 
performance than dispersed ownership in CEE and CIS, but foreign joint ventures rather than wholly owned 
foreign firms have a positive effect on TFP level. Worker ownership in CEE and CIS (collective ownership in 
China) does not seem to have a negative effect and data from CEE and CIS suggest that new firms are equally or 
more productively efficient than firms privatized to domestic owners and foreign start-ups appear to be more 
efficient than domestic ones. Many studies have examined the effect of privatization on other indicators and they 
yield results that are broadly in line with the findings on TFP. 
The results highlight the importance of good management and corporate governance, access to world 
markets, and the presence of a functioning legal and institutional framework. For the former state owned firms, 
this restructuring is most easily and effectively achieved by foreign ownership. Foreign firms routinely bring in 
capable expatriate managers and invest heavily in training local managers. They sell the products through their 
global distributional networks, introduce a relatively advanced system of corporate governance and stress the 
importance of business ethics. Corporate governance of foreign firms hence compensates to a considerable extent 
for the underdeveloped legal and institutional system in many transition economies. While some domestic firms 
have also developed good corporate governance, the underdeveloped legal system has allowed local managers (or 
block shareholders) in many privatized firms to maximize their own benefits at the expense of corporate 
performance and hence welfare of (other) shareholders as well as stakeholders such as workers and government 
treasury. This is likely to account for the limited positive performance effects of privatization to domestic private 
owners as compared to the performance of firms privatized to foreign investors. Interestingly. 
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